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Abstract
A model of mutual influence is presented where the structure of individual’s beliefs and the 
social structure both matter. The model thus combines processes of belief change base on 
Thagard’s (Behav Brain Sci 12:435–467, 1989) theory of mental coherence with plausible 
processes of social network change. This combination of cognitive and social processes 
has outcomes that are qualitatively different from either only cognitive or only social pro-
cesses, which shows the importance of studying these together. An illustration that moves 
towards representing the processes involved in Brexit is also exhibited to show the potential 
of this kind of simulation. Whilst only conceived of as an illustration of a kind of model, it 
is consistent with a number of observed patterns in opinion poll data, with some social and 
cognitive theories and only consists of plausible processes. This kind of model could also 
be used to relate and integrate different kinds of evidence into a coherent framework in the 
shape of more developed simulations.
Keywords Socio-cognitive system · Agent-based simulation · Politics · Social influence · 
Explanatory coherence · Thagard · Brexit · Opinion polls · Social intelligence · Opinions · 
Beliefs
1 Introduction
Many in the UK were surprised at the outcome of the Brexit vote. Thus, it is natural to 
want to understand the kind of processes that led to this, and similar processes of collec-
tive opinion change and formation. This paper describes some steps in that direction in the 
form of a model of mutual influence, where the structure of the agent beliefs and the social 
structure co-evolve. Such a model combines the cognitive with the social and requires a 
cross-validation methodology. It is consistent with a call to apply complexity science to the 
study of ideology (Homer-Dixon et al. 2013).
 * Bruce Edmonds 
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2  Motivation: some target macro patterns
In this section, we look at some of the patterns coming out of Brexit. The data comprises 
of all the public opinion polls aimed to be representative of the UK between 2011 and the 
referendum in 2016.1 Firstly, some of the clues about the kind of processes that might be 
involved. Figure 1 (left) shows the raw %Remain—%Leave difference in polls leading up to 
the final vote. However, this graph is somewhat difficult to read. Figure 1 (right) shows the 
same data, but (a) adjusted for known biases between telephone and online polls2 and (b) 
exponentially smoothed using a factor of 25%. These show definite medium-term trends, 
with periods of relative stability, but also what seem to be “turning points”. There is also a 
lot of smaller, short-term variation that maybe be measurement ‘noise’.
One of the factors that graphs, such as the above, leave out is that a significant propor-
tion of those polled are undecided. These people are important, because votes are often 
won by persuading the supporters of the other side to stay at home and not vote, and by 
persuading the undecided to vote for yourself. It is rare for someone to change sides from 
definitely one side to the other (especially on such a divisive issue as Brexit).
Figure 2 (left) shows each poll plotted in terms of the proportion for leaving against the 
proportion undecided. These differ greatly in terms of the proportion undecided because 
each poll is designed very differently in terms of how easy it is to choose undecided as an 
option. Some polls strongly encourage users to make a decision (e.g. by not offering it as 
an option). Figure 2 (right) is the equivalent graph but for remaining against undecided. In 
the actual Brexit poll there were a relatively large number of people that did not vote—not 
all of these would be due to being undecided or conflicted, but at least some for this reason. 
One can see that the final result is consistent with the polls if one takes the undecided into 
account (and interprets not voting as being undecided). If there were no undecided in the 
referendum, this data suggests that the result might have been different, but not voting is as 
much a choice as any other. Anecdotal evidence suggests that whilst some voters wavered 
between remain and undecided or between leave and undecided, there were very few who 
swapped between remain and leave.
Turning to the structure of social influence, there is no doubt that the social network 
along which influence can occur is clustered into those with similar beliefs. However, 
direct evidence for the structure of this is hard to come by and we have to be satisfied with 
indirect indications. Krasodomski-Jones of Demos (2016) selected 2500 at random from a 
larger population of political twitter accounts, divided equally into Labour, SNP, Tory and 
UKIP supporters (as well as a control group that I do not include here). It then analysed 
over a million tweets from these users from May–August 2016. One of these analyses was 
to see who re-tweeted tweets from whom. Table 1 shows a summary of this analysed by 
the party they support. They then visualised the re-tweet network in a similar manner to 
Adamic and Glance (2005) (Fig. 3). 
The picture that emerges is that these actors are very much sorted by (a) their own 
party and (b) on a roughly linear political spectrum. That is most re-tweets were within 
their own party. There was some re-tweeting between: UKIP & Tory, Tory & Labour, 
Labour & SNP, but very low levels of re-tweeting between SNP and either UKIP or 
Tory or between UKIP and either SNP or Labour. This is only a subset of the links of 
1 As collected by the financial times at: https ://ig.ft.com/sites /brexi t-polli ng/. Accessed: 2019-04-17. 
(Archived by  WebCite® at http://www.webci tatio n.org/77hwR be3Y)—a copy of the data in CSV format is 
available at: http://cfpm.org/data/ in the file called “list of individual EU referendum polls.csv”.
2 Internet polls consistently showed more support for leaving the EU than telephone polls.
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those existing in the larger population, those between actors that are far more politically 
involved than the average citizen and thus is likely to be more polarised than the general 
population. Furthermore, Twitter users seem to be disproportionately biased towards those 
interested in political matters. However, it does give us a striking pattern of polarisation.
The patterns I take from these are:
1. opinion formation is noisy and not smooth,
2. there are periods of relative stability but some turning points,
3. undecided actors matter almost as much as those of decided or fixed opinion, and
4. people communicate with (and hence tend to influence) those similar to themselves, and 
in particular have a tendency not to interact with those with dissimilar beliefs.
  These are the some of the patterns that I aimed for in the development of the presented 
model.
Table 1  Percentage of users 
re-tweeted by user group, from 
Krasodomski-Jones (2016)
> 40% in Bold, ≤ 40% and > 10% in Italic
Users re-tweeted
Labour (%) SNP (%) Tory (%) UKIP (%)
Users re-tweeting
 Labour 65 12 14 6
 SNP 18 78 8 3
 Tory 12 5 46 18
 UKIP 6 4 32 73
Fig. 3  The re-tweet network between 4 groups of 500 supporters of four UK parties, from Krasodomski-
Jones (2016)
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3  Theoretical background
In order to further constrain the model here, we have based the model upon a number of 
theoretical considerations, which I now discuss.
The “Social Intelligence Hypothesis” (SIH) (Kummer et al. 1997) states that the cru-
cial evolutionary advantages that human intelligence gives are due to the social abilities 
it allows. This explains specific abilities such as: imitation, language, social norms, lying, 
alliances, gossip, politics, group identification etc. Under this view, social intelligence is 
not a result of general intelligence being applied to social matters, but at the core of human 
intelligence. One might even go as far as saying that so-called “general intelligence” is a 
side-effect of social intelligence (e.g. linguistic ability and the ability to learn beliefs from 
others).
Consistent with SIH is the following evolutionary story. Social intelligence allows 
humans to develop their own (sub) cultures of knowledge, technologies, norms etc. (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985) within their groups. These allow the groups with their culture to 
inhabit a variety of ecological niches (e.g. the Kalahari, Polynesia) (Reader 1980). Thus 
humans, as a species, are able to survive catastrophes that effect different niches in differ-
ent ways (specialisation) since it is unlikely that all inhabited niches will be wiped out.
This means that different “cultures” of knowledge, skill, habits, norms, narratives etc. 
are significant (including how to socially organise, behave, coordinate etc.), and that these 
will relate to each other as a complete “package” to a significant extent. Under this view 
human cognition is (at least partly) evolved to make this group survival work, including the 
capacity of maintaining a complex set of beliefs that are coherent with others in the group, 
whilst retaining flexibility. Under this view humans are not evolved as primarily rational 
beings, but social beings, so we should expect their cognition to allow for some variation, 
but to maintain the set of beliefs that make up a complete culture. The model described 
herein exhibits such a combination of local coherency and global variety corresponding to 
the social structure.
Granovetter (1985) contrasted both under- and over-socialised models of behaviour of 
human behaviour—criticising sociologists in their picture of humans as culturally deter-
mined, and economists for their picture of agents characterised by self-interested behav-
iour. That is, that the particular patterns of social interactions between individuals mat-
ter. In other words, only looking at either individual behaviour or aggregate behaviour 
misses crucial aspects. Under this view, to understand the behaviour of individuals one 
has to understand the complex detail and dynamics of the interactions between them. Both 
individual cognition and how this relates to those of the society it is embedded into mat-
ter. Agent-based simulations are one of the few techniques that allow for such embedded 
behaviour to be represented and understood.
In particular, it allows for the integration of cognition and social processes, going 
beyond emergence and immergence to allow for a relatively ‘tight’ loop between the pro-
cesses that go on in the head of an agent, the interactions between agents and their social 
structure. In agent-based simulations, these three things can be co-evolving, no aspect tak-
ing priority.
A theory of cognition that fits these perspectives is that of cognitive coherence (Thagard 
1989). This is a theory that goes some way to explain how we choose what to believe and 
what not to. It is not based on any idea of logic or rationality, but rather on which mental enti-
ties are coherent with each other. Under this theory, new beliefs will usually only be accepted 
if they are coherent with the existing set of beliefs. As one matures the set of beliefs that one 
Co‑developing beliefs and social influence networks—towards…
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has grows more complex, meaning that it might be more selective in which other beliefs are 
likely to be accepted. Many of these beliefs will be learnt from an early age, characterising the 
culture it comes from. Questioning and even changing core beliefs is hard, because it might 
mean introducing dissonance with many other existing beliefs which might then also need to 
be changed.
This theory explains some of our cognitive features. The well known “confirmation bias” 
can be seen as a corollary, since evidence that disconfirms our beliefs will be less palatable 
than evidence that confirms them. Given that active perception also relies on beliefs about the 
world (e.g. what is worth attending to), this can lead to us not noticing or summarily reject-
ing evidence that disagrees with our beliefs as well as why different scientific paradigms can 
be incommensurable (Kuhn 1962). For example, even after President Obama made his Birth 
Certificate accessible to public scrutiny, many in the US would not change their belief that he 
was not born in the US (Nyhan 2012). This is thus one mechanism whereby “Directionally 
motivated reasoning” can occur. As (Taber and Lodge 2006) says:
Directionally motivated reasoning leads people to seek out information that reinforces 
their preferences (i.e., confirmation bias), counterargue information that contradicts their 
preferences (i.e., disconfirmation bias), and view proattitudinal information as more con-
vincing than counterattitudinal information (i.e., prior attitude effect)… (p. 757).
A later extension of this model (Thagard 2006) includes goals and emotions as entities that 
need to cohere. Thus one might not believe in climate change because you like driving your 
car, or might reject evidence about your performance because it would make you feel bad to 
accept it (Kruger and Dunning 1999). The model described here will be based on Thagard’s 
theory in order to incorporate some of the above features of human cognition.
To summarise this section I am aiming at a model:
(a) Where agents do sometimes accept beliefs that are suggested to them
(b) Where agents are socially embedded with a tight loop between cognition and social 
structure
(c) In which there naturally develops a combination of some coherency within emergent 
groups but also with variety
(d) Where “opinions” do not directly act on each other but emerge from a meaningful 
engagement of different beliefs
(e) Where the coherency of the belief set drives belief change in individuals
4  ‘Linear’ opinion dynamic models
There has been a stream of models that aim to directly model the evolution of opinions 
within a group of interacting agents. These are the “opinion dynamics” (OD) models (e.g. 
Hegselmann and Krause 2002; Deffuant et  al. 2002). In these the opinions of agents lie 
on a continuous line3 and these opinions directly effect each other when agents are suf-
ficiently similar/near to each other on this scale. Thus the term ‘linear’ here denotes that 
3 There are variations on this, a set of discrete values rather than continuous, a vector of binary values, 
more dimensions, but this does not change the resultant behavior much (Flache et al. 2017).
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the interaction occurs on a line of values (the opinions)—there is no structure in the opin-
ions—rather than that the model displays simple dynamics in the sense of “non-linear sys-
tems”. An example run of such a model is shown in Fig. 4.
However, such models exhibit resultant behaviour that is very different from that we 
observe (for example as exhibited during the Brexit vote as we saw previously). Firstly, 
the behaviour in OD models results in a number of stable groups that subsequently do not 
change. Secondly, typically all agents are influenced towards increased certainty as time 
progresses, so there are fewer (sometime no) uncertain agents left at the end. Thirdly, after 
a while, all opinions settle down to stable values.
But there is a more fundamental reason to object to OD models. They represent opin-
ions in terms of a linear scale (usually one dimensional and continuous) and further assume 
that influence occurs directly between agents via these values. In particular OD models do 
distinguish between agents who are conflicted and those who have no opinion. To take a 
simple example, consider the case of a single belief, “a” or its opposite “~a”. This gives 
rise to four possibilities: believing neither a or ~a, believing a only, believing ~a only and 
believing both a and ~a (as illustrated in the top half of Fig. 5). I have a feeling that includ-
ing such dissonant sets of beliefs (as in a and ~a) is particularly important for modelling 
political discussions, as this is a common experience of many individuals involved.
Fig. 4  A typical evolution of opinions from an opinion dynamics model. Horizontal axis shows the strength 
of the opinions (from − 1 = completely disagree, to 1 = completely agree). Time is along the x-axis. The col-
our shows the “certainty” of the agent from red = certain to blue = uncertain. (Color figure online)
Fig. 5  The four possibilities of 
belief in a proposition “a” or its 
negation “~a” (following Belnap 
1977), compared to a linear scale
{} 
{a, ~a}
{a} {~a}
1 -1 0 
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A ‘linear’ representation of opinions (as illustrated in the bottom half of Fig.  5) 
would represent these both as neutral in terms of belief. Whilst believing both a and ~a 
might seem daft at first glance, if you look at belief as rooted in evidence (or other pro-
cess), then one may well have some evidence for a and some evidence for ~a, and that 
would be a different situation from having no evidence for either (Belnap 1977). What 
all the OD models have in common is that opinion is essentially a matter of degree: 
degree to which opinions are held and, in many models, the degree of certainty of that 
opinion. Agents influence each other by their degrees maybe shifting the degrees of 
those they interact with.
What OD models miss out is any structural interaction with other beliefs. One method 
of doing this would be to have a set of beliefs that agents could hold (or not) with some 
kind of logical inference occurring between them. However, here I adopt an alternative 
theory, that of Thagard (1989, 2002). This is essentially a coherence model, that different 
beliefs are more or less coherent with each other so that a set of beliefs is more or less sta-
ble, due to the structure of coherencies between the individual beliefs. People seem quite 
good at tolerating low levels of incoherency but overall, people will tend to adapt their 
beliefs (dropping beliefs or adopting new beliefs) so as to increase the overall coherency.
To take a simple example, I might believe MB = {Manchester is the best city in the 
world}, RM = {It rains quite a lot in Manchester}4 and LM = {I want to live in Manches-
ter}. Here a strong coherence between MB and LM might keep my belief in LM, despite 
LM being somewhat dissonant with my other belief, RM. If a new belief or experience 
weakens the strong coherence between MB and LM (e.g. I have kids and realise that 
although Manchester is the best city for adults it is not so good for kids), then the disso-
nance between RM and LM might lead me to drop LM, even though I retain a version of 
MB.
In this paper I wish to go beyond ‘linear’ models of opinions, towards a more belief-
based representation, where the structure of individual’s belief sets matter. This is because 
I suspect that linear models of influence will not provide a good basis for explaining many 
observed collective processes.
5  The model
This model is an illustration of an idea—an idea of how cognitive and social structures 
might co-evolve to produce a collective phenomenon of opinion change in a population. 
Because the aim here is illustration rather than empirical, I have kept the model fairly 
simple. It aims to reproduce patterns, 1–4, listed at the end of the first section, the theo-
retical commitments, a–e, listed in the previous section and be based on plausible cogni-
tive and social processes. It shows one way in which belief change and influence based 
upon the coherency of underlying beliefs can be implemented within a model.
This is an agent-based simulation. That is the individuals and their interactions are 
individually represented in the simulation, allowing agents to have different charac-
teristics, for the social network to be dynamic and the outcomes to emerge from the 
4 Of course, it does rain in Manchester more than many places, but this stereotype has been much exagger-
ated.
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interactions between the agents. See (Squazzoni et  al. 2014) for an introduction and 
survey of agent-based simulation in the social sciences.
In this model there are a fixed number of agents. These are connected via a set of 
links that represent the social network, which determines which other agents any agent 
can interact with. However, the network can change—any agent can drop an existing 
link or make a new link depending on what happens to it.
There are a fixed number of distinct ‘foreground’ beliefs in the model. Other beliefs 
that the agents hold are not explicitly represented here. Each agent can either hold or 
not hold each of these beliefs, so if there are n explicitly represented beliefs in a ver-
sion of this model, then there are 2^n possible belief sets that each agent in that model 
could have. Thus this model could be conceived of as each agent having a binary belief 
vector, with each position having a 1 for belief or 0 for a lack of belief for each one. 
It is assumed that sets of agents share a set of ‘background’ beliefs that do not change 
but are not explicitly represented. For many purposes it would be impractical to try and 
represent all the beliefs of those involved—we want to understand and track a relatively 
small number of contested beliefs.
In this model beliefs are not independent of each other. That is, if an agent believes A 
this will affect whether it also believes B. This is achieved here using a function of belief 
coherency, which is a generalisation of Thagard’s pairwise (in)coherence (as discussed 
above). It gives a measure of the extent to which the whole set of current beliefs is coher-
ent. This allows for great flexibility in how coherent different belief sets are (compared to 
a pairwise dissonance/consonance between beliefs or a measure based on logical infer-
ence). For example we could have the coherency evaluations: {A}→0.3 and {B}→{0.7} 
but also {A, B}→− 0.4 if beliefs A and B are mutually inconsistent, but individually 
coherent (against the background beliefs). Thus, the structure of this model does not put 
any constraint upon how belief sets relate to their coherency, this is up to the programmer.
There are two important ways that the beliefs of agents can change. One agent may ‘sug-
gest’ one of its beliefs to another agent it is connected with. The receiving agent may then 
adopt that belief, thus adding it to those it already has. In the other direction, an agent can 
unilaterally drop one of its beliefs. The tendency of gaining a new belief from another or 
dropping an existing belief in this model is monotonically dependent on whether it increases 
or decreases the coherency of the node’s belief set. This is a strong assumption behind this 
model, but a plausible one—all it says is that people tend towards more coherent belief sets. 
Here we implement this tendency as a probability of change within two processes.
There is another link in the chain needed here, a mapping from the extent of any 
change in belief coherency to the probability of the belief change occurring—a mono-
tone function from changes in coherency to such probabilities. Depending on the shape 
of this, the strength of tendency towards more coherent belief sets can be determined. 
A relatively ‘flat’ function would mean that coherency was a soft influence on belief 
change, so that belief change is more random, e.g. allowing temporary decreases 
in coherency. A ‘steep’ function would have the effect that only belief changes that 
increased coherency would be likely to occur. Thus this mapping function affects how 
strongly coherence impacts upon belief change in agents: from noisy and tolerant of 
incoherence to unidirectional and ‘logical’. Let us call this the “scaling function”.
In parallel to this process of belief change are changes in the social network. The 
model without network change is described and explored in Edmonds (2012). There 
are two main processes whereby links can change: dropping and adding links. The first 
is where an agent drops a link to another agent. Here we are following the principle of 
homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954), so that agents with incompatible beliefs will 
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tend to interact less. The way this is implemented here is that if a belief that is suggested 
by an agent is not adopted then there is a probability the link to the suggesting agent is 
deleted. Given the processes of belief adoption the reasons for non-adoption are likely 
to be that the suggested belief was incoherent with the existing belief set of the receiv-
ing agent, corresponding to incompatible views. The other process is one of link crea-
tion. With a given probability, an agent will make a new link—to a ‘friend of a friend’ 
if there is one not already linked to, otherwise to a random other agent. This process 
can be seen as one of exploring and making new connections—of course, if their beliefs 
turn out to be incompatible then the link might be dropped again via the first process. 
There is no ‘magic’ comparison of the contents of agents’ heads here, both link drop-
ping and creation are via socially plausible processes.
To help explore and illustrate what happens when the above processes happen 
together, there are different types of agents. Each type represents a set of agents with a 
shared set of background beliefs, represented here by the same coherency function, and 
the susceptibility to coherence, respected here by having same scaling function. In the 
examples below different types and their proportions are specified then randomly con-
nected, supplied with random beliefs and the results of the above processes explored.
A more detailed description of the model can be found in the “Appendix”.
6  The co‑development of individual belief and social structure
Two examples will be given to show some of the properties of this model and why it 
might be interesting to develop. The first, described in this section, is to show the essen-
tial co-development of individuals’ beliefs and social structure—why the combination 
of belief change and network change can result in qualitatively different outcomes than 
either belief change or network change on its own.
For purposes of exposition, beliefs are arbitrarily assigned colours and types of 
agents shapes. In the example in this (and the following section):
• There are 50 agents
• Simulations last 1000 simulation ticks
• There are, on average 3 arcs per node
• The copy-rate parameter is 0.3 (the probability that one belief is considered for 
being copied along any link)
• The drop-rate parameter is 0.075 (the probability that an agent considers dropping 
one belief in a tick)
• Probability of dropping a link is 0.2 (if there is a suitable candidate where a copy 
has been rejected)
• Probability of a random belief change is 0.001
If not otherwise mentioned parameter values for the runs below are those listed in the 
“Appendix”. In order to see the resultant possible patterns in terms of opinion change (as 
might be see with repeated opinion polls such as in Fig. 1) We need some way of recover-
ing an opinion from agents. Here (and in the following example) this is done in a simple 
manner whereby the belief sets: ({blue},{}, {blue, yellow}, {yellow}) is mapped to (1, 0, 
0, − 1). The derived opinions thus reduce to the number of “blue” beliefs minus the num-
ber of “yellow” beliefs divided by the population.
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This example helps give a flavour of the model. In this:
• There are 3 tracked beliefs: “yellow”, “blue” and “red”
• The probability of a new link is 0.01
The two kinds of agent are as follows.
• 20% of agents (stars) are such that the ‘yellow’ beliefs are attractive and the ‘blue’ ones 
unattractive (due to coherence with background beliefs). Here (yellow, neither, both, 
blue) are mapped to (1, 0, 0, − 1) respectively (red make no difference). They are also 
‘strong minded’ in the sense that they only change their mind if it increases their coher-
ence (a strong mapping function similar to the bottom graph of Fig. 21).
• 80% of agents (circles) are such that the ‘blue’ beliefs are attractive and the ‘yel-
low’ ones unattractive. Here (yellow, neither, both, blue) are mapped to (− 1, 0, 0, 1) 
respectively. They are also ‘weak minded’ in the sense that they only have a tendency 
to change their mind if it increases their coherence (more probabilistic in their belief 
change with a mapping similar to the top graph in Fig. 21).
Both kinds change their links (or not) similarly and both are agnostic with respect to the 
‘red’ belief. Runs are initialised with random beliefs and network.
Here we try 10 runs of each variant: with no belief change and no link change; with 
belief change only; with link change only; and with both belief and link change. Output is 
shown in terms of some typical runs and some summary graphs. In snapshots of the runs, 
agents shown in colours indicating the mixture of beliefs held (or if none, grey)—so blue if 
they only hold the Blue belief, green if they hold yellow and blue, etc. The shapes indicate 
what coherency (and scaling function) the agents have, which are (at least initially) inde-
pendent of their beliefs which are randomly initialised at the start.
When only beliefs are allowed to change, there is some sorting of agents, so agents who 
are connected are more likely to hold similar beliefs, but the fixed network structure limits 
the extent to which this can occur. There has been a shift in the balance of beliefs—a shift 
towards blue (Fig. 6).
When only links are allowed to change, then some structure can evolve that partially 
separates agents with different beliefs. The balance between blue and yellow beliefs is 
largely unchanged (remember there is some random change) (Fig. 7).
When both beliefs and network can change we find that a considerable sorting of kinds 
of agents has occurred, with the “stars” being marginalised. There has been a marked shift 
in overall opinion towards the blue (remember the purple are agents that hold the blue 
belief but also the red etc.) (Fig. 8).
Fig. 6  Four snapshots of the run where only beliefs are able to change. (Color figrue online)
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Figure 9 the proportion of links with the same kind of agent at its ends by the end of the 
simulations variants, averaged over 10 runs. This shows that the combination of belief change 
(a cognitive process) and link change (a social process) produces qualitatively different 
results from either belief change only or link change only. Sometimes one has to study cogni-
tive and social processes together if one is to understand how they might work in practice.
7  Towards a Brexit example
In the second set of results we move towards the kind of situation that occurred in the 
Brexit referendum. Here we have three groups: floaters (most voters), yellows (Leave 
campaigners) and blues (Remain campaigners). The different types reflect anecdotal 
Fig. 7  4 snapshots of the run only allowing links to change
Fig. 8  4 snapshots of a run where both beliefs and links change
Fig. 9  Proportion of same kinds 
together at end (av. over 10 runs, 
“drop & add” = link change, “bel 
ch” = belief change)
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observation that whilst leavers argued using fierce emotive language and seemed largely 
immune to corrections of fact or argument, the remaining arguments were more equivocal, 
e.g. “Yes, there is a lot wrong with the EU, but on balance we are better off remaining”. 
On the other hand those arguing actively to remain outnumbered those for leave. Thus, the 
model is composed of:
• 70% Floaters (circles), these are weakly positive towards having either yellow or blue 
beliefs, but not both. So (yellow, neither, both, blue) are mapped to (1, 0, − 1, 1) respec-
tively They have a weak scaling function so they are more open to change and more toler-
ant of temporarily tolerating moves to lower coherence (so similar to top curve in Fig. 21).
• 10% Leavers (stars) are for yellow and against blue with a strong scaling function 
(leave) as in the last example.
• 20% Remainers (triangles) are for blue and against yellow (as in the last example), 
with a medium scaling function (remain) (with a curve somewhere between those in 
Fig. 21).
Groups start separate (to allow for self-reinforcement), so that initially nodes are only 
linked with others of their type. They are initialised with random beliefs.
There are two beliefs: blue and yellow, the opinion function is the same as before 
(blue–yellow). The probability of a new link is 0.025 in these runs. There are no variants of 
the run (other than having different random seeds). All runs have the same proportions of 
agents, kind of initialization and parameters.
When the simulation is run 1000 times, we get the distribution of final average opinions 
as shown in Fig. 10. One can see that, given this set-up there is a slight overall bias towards 
blue (remain) outcomes.
Below I will merely display 4 specific runs to show the kinds of dynamics that this 
model can display. For each of these I will show 4 snapshots of the state of the model (as 
before) plus a graph that shows how the average opinion changed over time.
7.1  Example run 1
In this run the stars connect with floaters first, followed by the circles which has the effect 
of polarising the floaters, which then separate off into two groups. In each of these groups, 
the campaigners slowly convert the floaters to their own colour. One can see how the cam-
paigners of both sides are now embedded within tightly formed groups (Fig.  11). The 
Fig. 10  Distribution of final aver-
age opinions over 1000 runs
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average opinion oscillates between blue and yellow over time but the blues gather the big-
gest group in the end and win (Fig. 12). This might correspond to a situation where there 
two separate groups formed, each lead by their own influencers.
7.2  Example run 2
In the second run a similar thing happens, two groups are established (earlier) which 
are stable for a while. Then some yellow mutate within the blue island, which then pulls 
apart. The yellow group then integrates into other and converts some more of the floaters 
(Fig. 13). Figure 14 shows the stability of the overall opinion for blue until towards the end 
where the yellow group manage to connect into the main group and shift some more float-
ers to their side, winning in the end. This could relate to situations where separate groups 
can join up and produce a less polarised range to opinion.
7.3  Example run 3
In this run, we have a ‘Westminster bubble’ of stars and triangles forming, separate from 
the floaters (Fig. 15). Free from influence from campaigners, floaters flip each other back 
and forth but in a random walk, which happens to end with more yellow (Fig. 16). This 
Fig. 11  Four snapshots of example run 1
Fig. 12  The changing average opinion in example run 1
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could correspond to a situation where politicians focus on influencing each other, not con-
necting with the general public and hence allowing their opinion to drift.
7.4  Example run 4
In this run, both starts and triangles connect with floaters, but triangles more intimately, 
stars always on the peripheral. The yellow stars connect repeatedly to the main group but 
are isolated again each time, so they do not ever gain enough influence to convert many 
floaters (Fig. 17). The average opinion oscillates but always on the blue side (Fig. 18).
If one measures the end diversity of beliefs in linked nodes and the homogeneity 
of types (circles etc.) linked over 1000 runs one ends up with two distinct clusters of 
Fig. 13  Four snapshots of example run 2
Fig. 14  The changing average opinion in example run 2
Fig. 15  Four snapshots of example run 3
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outcome (Fig.  19). These correspond to a situation where all agents are linked and 
hence a range of beliefs as they moderate each other (the green cluster in Fig. 19) and 
where clusters of more similar kinds are linked together, but beliefs are more polarised.
8  Model limitations and extensions
This model is highly stylised with many simplifications made consistent with its aim of 
illustration. These include that: there is a fixed number of agents, only a limited number of 
foreground beliefs are represented, beliefs are individually identifiable and discrete, belief 
Fig. 16  The changing average opinion in example run 3
Fig. 17  Four snapshots of example run 4
Fig. 18  The changing average opinion in example run 4. (Color figure online)
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propagation is only done agent to agent (there is nothing corresponding to broadcast media 
here), dropped beliefs are not remembered but have to be re-suggested by a link neighbour, 
the coherency and scaling functions are unchanging for each agent, and that a social net-
work adequately represents the communication possibilities between agents.
However, many of the limitations imposed here are not necessary. The agents need not 
be fixed but agents could drop out or and join the simulation. Super agents that suggest 
beliefs to many others could be added to represent broadcast media (the process of dropping 
links would naturally lead to agents selecting the media that suited their view). The scaling 
functions here are fixed for each type of agent, but these could be allowed to develop along 
with other aspects of the simulation, but a simple accumulation of beliefs can already have 
the effect of ‘locking in’ complicated belief structures once they have accumulated. Entities 
representing agent goals and emotions could be added. More complicated algorithms for 
agent social structure could be added, such as forming links through the institutions one 
participates in as in (Fieldhouse et al. 2016). Beliefs could be given more internal structure 
allowing some inference along with the coherence. However, for the purpose of illustration 
of the key ideas, these needlessly complicate the model, so have not been adopted here. If a 
more empirical model was attempted one might add some of these.
This kind of model does have more options and parameters than a standard OD model. 
Furthermore OD models are easier to compare to evidence from such as experiments—one 
can simply measure the opinions of participants before and after interaction, and do not have 
to delve into the murky world of beliefs etc. This reflects the difference in purpose—whilst 
some intend for OD models to be predictive of (average) opinion change, given an initial mix 
of opinions and certainties, the model presented here is more descriptive in intent—a wish to 
represent and understand how opinion change may occur. I would like to be able to explain 
the observed outcomes and patterns in opinion change come about from basic mechanisms of 
belief change, but this is still someway off.
9  Related models
There are two models that do look at the interaction of different beliefs. The first is (Jager and 
Amblard 2005a, b) which looks at a two dimensional model of opinions, based on “Social 
Judgement Theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961). That is there are three zones of interaction: 
Fig. 19  A scatter graph of the 
diversity of beliefs between 
linked nodes and the homogene-
ity of types of agents linked at 
the end of 1000 runs of 1000 
ticks. (Color figure online)
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one when attitudes are sufficiently similar (in which case the converge a bit), one when they 
differ sufficiently to have the opposite effect and a neutral zone. This is combined with the 
“Elaboration Likelihood Model” of (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), which identifies two routes to 
attitude change: a central (conscious) and a peripheral (unconscious) route to attitude change. 
Although the two dimensions are basically independent, they explore different processes for 
agent–agent interaction within a 2D grid that link the two, for example closeness in the central 
dimension affecting the attitudes in the peripheral dimension. They conclude that that periph-
eral processing can be “responsible for the emergence of a correlation between originally 
unrelated issues”. This model does not deal with attitudes that are meaningfully related for the 
agents (the relatedness emerges as a result of the social process) but might explain effects such 
as described in (Macy et al. 2015).
Friedkin et al. (2016) model situations with a fixed weighted influence network between 
nodes and a universal matrix of co-certainty between beliefs. Each time click, beliefs are prop-
agated to others within the agent via the co-certainty matrix, then linearly influenced by the 
corresponding beliefs of other agents via the weighted network, but this is moderated by the 
self-weights of nodes that ‘anchor’ the resulting beliefs to the nodes original belief (depending 
on its self-weight). They illustrate this model with a few examples, showing how the certainty 
of beliefs converge under group interaction in a similar, sometimes multimodal, but smooth 
manner shown in the OD models above. Whilst this is based on linear algebra and so can be 
rapidly calculated and analysed, but this does mean that the model tends to smoothly con-
verge, but maybe to a series of clusters. They do not explore the model with any negative 
values in the influence weights or in the co-certainty matrix (which might allow for mutually 
incompatible beliefs). The influence of nodes on each other is the same for all their beliefs, 
and all nodes have the same co-certainty matrix.
10  The prospects for validation and integrating evidence on beliefs
In Moss and Edmonds (2005) we suggested an approach of “cross-validation”. That is, 
using qualitative evidence to inform the specification of an agent-based model, but then 
validating the outcomes against available statistical or time-series evidence. This is a way 
of checking a simulation that is used to explain the aggregate outcomes from the micro-
level processes that are used to program agent behaviour. However, the measured out-
comes from the simulation just described will match any independent data (such as those 
on Brexit) in terms of exact value—this is not its purpose. Rather what is possible is that 
a future version of this model could simultaneously match the patterns of such processes. 
That is, it would be a pattern-oriented modelling approach (Grimm et  al. 2006), where 
many different patterns are matched at the same time. Matching many patterns simultane-
ously is difficult to fudge with simple model calibration and (given enough patterns) can be 
as effective at constraining model possibilities as matching up a couple of graphs in terms 
of simple value. Roughly, in order not to be deceiving ourselves, the constraint from evi-
dence (of all kinds) needs to be greater that the ability of the model to fit these constraints 
by adjust arbitrary elements in the model (both processes and free parameters). This can 
be addressed from both sides: by increasing the number of patterns that the model has to 
reproduce, but also limiting the elements in the specification of a model that are not sup-
ported by evidence—the ‘KIDS’ approach (Moss and Edmonds 2005).
However, in this case this depends upon our ability to inform the specification of the 
simulation using the available evidence, including qualitative evidence (Lotzmann and 
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Neumann 2017). Ideally, for this model we would be able to identify the relevant ‘fore-
ground’ beliefs (those that are subject to doubt and change) and (at least approximately) 
map their relative coherency with each other. However, this is exactly what (Boutyline and 
Vaisey 2017) do, they use survey data from a population of individuals to infer the strength 
of association between different beliefs. This kind of mapping could be used as a base line 
for identifying beliefs and their coherence; this could then be supplemented by surveys of 
participants on which of these beliefs they held.
In this model, although the processes are plausible and accord somewhat to some 
existing theory, they are not evidence-based. To put these on a better footing, qualitative 
accounts as to how and under what circumstances people change their minds (accepting 
new beliefs or dropping existing ones) or alter who they interact with could be used. This 
would take narrative accounts from people (either written themselves or transcribed from 
an interview) and analyse these to inform computational representations of these for speci-
fying the rules for agents in a simulation (Edmonds 2015).
11  Concluding discussion
In this model, here are ‘competing’ processes of social influence (suggestion) versus inter-
nal coherence with existing set of beliefs; also between social influence versus social link-
ing. Thus, an ‘extreme’ group may be good at convincing another group when well con-
nected to that group but groups tend to disconnect from those with very different views to 
themselves.
How processes actually happen may matter a lot, so it may be that this model has these 
wrong. We just do not know what influences people’s change of links—do people have a 
‘whitelist’ of those they are willing to allow to influence them? In addition, this model does 
not touch upon the development of people’s belief structures within their society during 
acculturation or youth.
However, this model does suggest possibilities. It may be that how we act collectively 
is not through a direct spread (imitation) of action but via a spread of beliefs, norms, sto-
ries, habits etc. from which directed action springs. This would allow for specialisation 
and diversity of action whilst maintaining coherency. In this picture culture (any pattern, 
knowledge, norms, technology passed down the generations etc.) is important, but the 
group-structure of society is dynamic and can be complex (almost fractal in structure). 
It does vividly show that if one modelled only the belief change/influence processes 
or only the social network processes then one could be missing significant aspects 
of what might be happening during these complex socio-cognitive processes. Thus, 
the main conclusion might be that we sometimes need to model both social and cog-
nitive processes together—mutually influencing each other—to capture some social 
phenomena.
Like a tethered goat (Fig. 20), individuals may find it hard to wander too far from the 
belief set of the group it is currently attached to,5 but we might be able to choose to which 
group we are tied. 
5 It is always possible to question some of one’s beliefs, but not all of them.
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Appendix: more about the model
This model is an extension of the one discussed in Edmonds (2012), but with network 
change processes added. The full model has quite a number of options and extensions not 
discussed here. The code and full documentation can be accessed from the CoMSES.net 
archive (Edmonds 2016).
Basic entities and processes
In this model:
• There is a network of a fixed set of nodes and arcs (that can change)
• There are, n, different beliefs {A, B,…} circulating between nodes
• Beliefs are copied along links or dropped by nodes according to the change in coher-
ency of the node’s belief set that this would result in
• Links can be randomly made
• Links are dropped when beliefs are rejected for copy between nodes
Fig. 20  A tethered goat
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Node properties
Each node has:
• A (possibly empty) set of these “beliefs” that it holds
• A fixed “coherency” function from possible sets of beliefs to [− 1, 1] where 1 is com-
pletely coherent, 0 is neutral and − 1 is maximum incoherency.
• A fixed scaling function that maps changes in coherency to the probability of a change 
in beliefs
• A record of the last node it “rejected” a belief from
Initialisation
Beliefs and social structure are randomly initialized at the start according to some 
global parameters. In the variants explored here there can be up to 3 types of agent, 
which are only distinguished by their coherency and scaling functions.
Coherency function
The coherency function is a function from all possible sets of the possible beliefs to real 
values in the range [− 1, 1]. This is the key measure on beliefs—changes in this deter-
mines the probabilities of belief change by agents.
Belief change processes
Each iteration the following occurs:
• Copying: each arc is selected; a source end and destination end selected; a belief 
at the source is randomly selected; then copied to the destination with a probabil-
ity related to the change in coherency it would cause (due to the scaling function 
described next).
• Dropping: each node is selected; a random belief is selected and then dropped with a 
probability related to the change in coherency it would cause
Scaling impact of coherency function
There is a variety of ways to map a change in coherence to a probability (of a change occur-
ring). The function that maps from changes in coherency to probability could be any that: 
(a) is monotonic (b) such that a − 1→1 change has probability of 1 (b) a 1→− 1 change has 
probability of 0. Two example such functions are illustrated in Fig. 21.
The scaling function in this model thus affects how amenable an agent is to change and 
the extent to which it may change. E.g. whether only to increase coherency or if it can 
occasionally decrease. A more gradual function (such as the top graph in Fig. 21) means 
that the “pressure” towards coherency is relatively weak, so more often changes of belief 
might temporarily go in the direction of greater incoherence, for example accepting a belief 
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that is not completely compatible with existing beliefs. A sharper function (such as the bot-
tom graph in Fig. 21) means that only changes that increase coherency are likely to occur.
Network change processes
There are two processes for changing the influence network. Each iteration the following 
occurs for each agent:
• Link drop: with a probability: if a belief copy was rejected by the recipient, then drop 
that in-link.
• New links: with another probability, create a new link with a random other (with a 
friend of a friend if possible, otherwise any)
Recovering opinions from beliefs
The “opinion” of agents is derived from the belief state of the agents. There are a number 
of ways in which one could do this. One interesting way might be to say the opinion of an 
agent on an issue, X, is the change in coherence that would occur to the belief set of that 
agent if X were added to their beliefs. In the examples above I chose a simple function from 
the belief set to [− 1, 1], namely {blue}→1, {}→0, {blue, yellow}→0, {yellow}→− 1. The 
global opinion is an average of this function applied to each agent.
Other
In order to maintain the average link density I added the following ‘kludges’: If there are 
too many links (as set by arcs-per-node) slightly increase the rate of link drop, if there are 
Fig. 21  Two example mappings from a change in coherency to a probability (of either a “copy” or a “drop” 
of a belief)
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not enough, slightly reduce the rate of link drop. Also, nodes have to have at least one link, 
or one is added, to stop isolates forming.
Finally there is a small probability that a belief is randomly added or dropped, this adds 
a little bit of extrinsic noise into the system and stops beliefs disappearing (through chance) 
from the entire population (as discussed in Edmonds 2012). This is kept at a low level in all 
the examples discussed, 0.001 per node per tick.
Parameters
A full list of parameters with descriptions maybe be found in the documentation accompa-
nying the model (Edmonds 2016). Important parameters for our purposes include the fol-
lowing (the default value is shown in brackets following the description).
• num-agents: number of agents in the simulation (50)
• num-beliefs: number of atomic beliefs around (2)
• init-prob-belief: probability that agents hold each of the atomic beliefs at the start (0.5)
• copy-prob: the probability that a (random) belief from one agent will be attempted to 
be copied to anther during the copy process (0.3)
• drop-rate: the drop-rate is the probability that an individual will do the drop process 
once (per simulation tick) (0.075)
• mut-prob-power: this is the power of 10 of the probability that a random belief of an 
agent is flipped each time click (so − 3 is a probability of 0.001)
• arcs-per-node: how many arcs lead into each node on average (3)
• init-sep-prob: the probability that types only link to their own kind at the start (1)
• init-prob-drop-link: the probability of dropping a link (0.2)
• prob-new-link: this is probability of adding a new random link (0.025)
• Opinion-Fn-Name: the function that is used for recovering the opinion from the beliefs 
of agents which is then averaged for the global Opinion (blue–yellow)
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